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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
As New York Yankees legend, and baseball Hall of Famer, Yogi Berra, once 
said, "This is like deja vu all over again." 
After having been granted a new trial based on the Idaho Supreme Court's 
conclusion that Corporal Fred Rice, an expert accident reconstructionist employed by 
the Idaho State Police, testified falsely for the State at his first trial, Jonathan Ellington's 
second-degree murder/aggravated battery case was remanded for a second trial. 
During the second trial, the State offered the testimony of a different accident 
reconstruction expert-John Daily. Mr. Daily, like Cpl. Rice before him, testified falsely. 
When new evidence of the falsity of Mr. Daily's testimony (i.e., material in a 
textbook co-authored by Mr. Daily, which showed that Mr. Daily's critical calculations 
and conclusions in this case were dependent on a formula that had no application in this 
case) came to light shortly after Mr. Ellington's second trial, he promptly filed a motion 
for a new trial. That motion, however, was denied by the district court. 
On appeal, Mr. Ellington contends that the district court erred by denying his 
motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The basic facts of this case were summarized by the Idaho Supreme Court in the 
appeal following Mr. Ellington's first trial 1: 
1 Because both the prior appeal (No. 33843), and this appeal, involve the same case, 
the record in this appeal picks up where the record in the prior appeal ended. 
Accordingly, Mr. Ellington is filing a separate motion requesting that Supreme Court 
take judicial notice of the record in the prior appeal. Assuming that motion will be 
granted, the record in the prior appeal is cited herein. All such citations are provided 
with the prefix "No. 33843." 
1 
At about 11 :00 a.m. on January 1, 2006, Mr. Ellington left his friend 
Ron Cunningham's house in Athol, Idaho, to go back home. While driving, 
he came upon a white Honda Accord, driven by Jovon Larsen, age 22, 
with her sister Joleen, 18, in the passenger seat. Mr. Ellington claims the 
girls were playing "cat and mouse" with him, attempting to cut him off, and 
that they flipped him off. Joleen claims that they were not cutting 
Mr. Ellington off, and Jovon maintains that they did not flip off 
Mr. Ellington. Mr. Ellington passed the Honda in his Chevy Blazer, and at 
the next stop sign, got out of his car, approached the Honda that was now 
stopped behind him, and yelled and cursed at the girls and hit the driver's 
side window.1 
1 Since Mr. Ellington did not testify at trial, most of the factual 
background in the record on appeal was provided by the State's 
witnesses. Particularly, the only description of the altercation and 
ensuing chase was the trial testimony of Mr. Larsen, Jovon and 
Joleen. We understand by the argument made by Mr. Ellington in 
his briefing to this Court that the facts regarding how the incident 
began and progressed are contested by Mr. Ellington. 
The girls called 911 and began following Mr. Ellington because 
there were no license plates on his vehicle and they wanted the police to 
be able to track him. After a short while, Mr. Ellington made a U-turn on 
the road and faced the girls, driving into their lane and then swerving back 
into the correct lane, passing them going the other way. Joleen testified 
that as Mr. Ellington went by them he flipped them off and mouthed an 
expletive at them. The girls turned around to continue to follow 
Mr. Ellington but were unable to catch up with him, and he went back 
home. 
The girls decided to stop and wait for an officer from the sheriff's 
department to arrive, as they were instructed to do by the 911 operator, 
and then called their parents, Joel and Vonette Larsen, who arrived about 
fifteen minutes later. The deputy sheriff arrived and then left again to 
investigate, and Mr. and Mrs. Larsen went the other way to look for 
Mr. Ellington in their Subaru. While driving along the road, Mr. and 
Mrs. Larsen saw the Blazer drive out of an adjacent driveway and back 
onto the road, and they began to follow it. As the Blazer and the Subaru 
turned the corner that Joleen and Jovon were waiting at, the girls pulled 
the Honda out behind the Blazer but in front of their parents in the 
Subaru.2 At the same time, Joleen placed another call to 911. The girls 
were going about ninety miles per hour and Mr. Ellington was probably 
going about a hundred miles per hour. Mr. Ellington turned onto Scarcello 
Road, going westbound, and both the girls in the Honda and Mr. and 
Mrs. Larsen in the Subaru continued to chase him. Although the 911 
dispatcher told the girls to be careful, that Mr. Ellington was likely driving 
fast because he was scared, and to stop following the Blazer once they 
told her they were going ninety miles an hour, the girls did not stop.3 
2 
2 Joleen also claims that Mr. Ellington again flipped them off when 
he drove by. 
3 After the 911 operator told Joleen that the police officer "wants 
you to pull over and not-not follow him at that speed, okay?" 
Joleen responded, "Well we want to keep our-we can slow down. 
That's not a problem. We just want to see where he turns when he 
gets on 41." 
Mr. Ellington made a left turn into a driveway on the south side of 
Scarcello Road, apparently intending to reverse his direction, where he 
skidded onto a snowbank. The Subaru then passed the Honda, coming 
into the (incorrect) eastbound lane of traffic. Mr. Larsen has testified 
inconsistently as to whether he was attempting to block the Blazer in, or 
whether he was attempting to block the Blazer from hitting the Honda. On 
direct examination, Mr. Larsen testified: "I told the wife, I go get around the 
girls and block him from hitting the girls, because he's already threatened 
the girls, he ran them off the road, I wanted to protect my girls." In 
contrast, Deputy William Klinkefus testified that when he interviewed 
Mr. Larsen upon arriving at the scene, Mr. Larsen told him that he "was 
able to park his vehicle behind the [Blazer] in an attempt to block him in so 
that they could wait for law enforcement to get there.,,4 
4 Mr. Larsen explained this discrepancy in his statements at trial as 
a result of him not being properly able to articulate what he meant, 
which was that he was attempting to "block" Mr. Ellington from 
hitting his daughters' car. 
Mr. Ellington reversed back out of the snowbank and was now 
pointed back east. As Mr. Ellington was attempting to drive away 
eastbound down Scarcello Road, the Blazer made contact with the front of 
the Larsens' Subaru which was still slowly moving toward the Blazer, 
seemingly blocking most of the eastbound lane. Acceleration marks 
suggest that Mr. Ellington was attempting to swerve around the Subaru. 
The expert testimony at trial also tended to show that the impact with the 
Subaru caused the Blazer to rotate somewhat in a counterclockwise 
direction, so that the Blazer was pointing across the road toward where 
the Honda was in the westbound lane, instead of pointing toward its initial 
path eastbound.5 After making contact with the Subaru, the Blazer 
continued past the Subaru and impacted the front left corner of the Honda 
which was located mostly in the opposite, westbound lane.6 
5 Mr. Larsen testified that after the Blazer impacted the Subaru, 
Mr. Ellington "could have left, he could have went straight and left" 
but that instead he turned around the Subaru and accelerated 
toward the Honda. 
6 While Jovon maintained during her testimony at trial that they 
were completely in the westbound lane, even the State's accident 
3 
reconstructionist testified that the scuff marks over the centerline of 
the road indicated that the front of the Honda extended at least 
twelve to seventeen inches over the center line. 
After the impact, the Blazer rode up onto the Honda, and the Blazer 
pushed the Honda across the road and into the shoulder on the opposite 
side. Mr. Larsen then grabbed his .44 Magnum revolver from under his 
seat in the Subaru and got out of the passenger side of the car to run 
toward the Blazer, right around the time it was backing up and 
disengaging from the Honda. At the same time, Mrs. Larsen got out of the 
Subaru and ran toward the Honda. Mr. Larsen approached the passenger 
side of the Blazer around the same time that Mr. Ellington put the Blazer 
into drive. Mr. Larsen initially leveled his gun at Mr. Ellington from right 
outside the Blazer's passenger window, and then because he did not want 
to hit his daughters, fired a shot that traveled through the front-quarter 
passenger-side panel of the Blazer, allegedly attempting to hit the motor. 
Mrs. Larsen was running across the road in front of Mr. Ellington, 
attempting to get to her daughters, and as Mr. Ellington punched the gas, 
she put her hands up and started to move back toward the middle of the 
road. Mrs. Larsen was struck by Mr. Ellington, which caused her body to 
come down on the hood of the Blazer before falling to the road. Once she 
fell to the road, the tires of the Blazer ran over her head and torso, causing 
catastrophic injuries that resulted in her death. Mr. Ellington left the scene 
and went back to the Cunningham residence, where he had been earlier 
in the day, and was eventually arrested there after police officers spotted 
his car. 
Mr. Ellington was charged with two counts of aggravated battery for 
hitting the Honda, and one count of second-degree murder for 
Mrs. Larsen's death. At Mr. Ellington's first preliminary hearing, the 
magistrate found that there was not sufficient evidence to bind 
Mr. Ellington over for second-degree murder or for the aggravated 
batteries at issue here. The State then dismissed the original charges and 
refiled them under a new case. At the second preliminary hearing before a 
different magistrate Mr. Ellington was bound over on all charges. On 
March 23, 2006, Mr. Ellington filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the 
evidence adduced at the second preliminary hearing was not sufficient to 
hold him for trial. The court denied the motion, finding no abuse of 
discretion by the magistrate, while noting at least in the case of the 
aggravated battery counts, 
a serious question is present in this case as to whether 
Mr. Ellington was trying to escape a volatile situation or 
whether he intentionally brought harm to the girls or acted 
willfully in crashing into their car. In this court's opinion that is 
a question for a jury to resolve. 
4 
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 56-58 (2011) (hereinafter Ellington 1).2 
Mr. Ellington was first tried in 2006. After deliberating for approximately a day 
and a half, the jury in that first trial returned guilty verdicts on all counts. Id. at 59. 
Mr. Ellington then successfully appealed. See generally id. The Idaho Supreme Court 
held the State had engaged in misconduct (including a comment on Mr. Ellington's 
silence and multiple improper emotional appeals),3 and that the district court had 
committed multiple evidentiary errors (including admitting testimony from one of the 
2 The Supreme Court's recitation of the facts is obviously derived from the evidence 
adduced at Mr. Ellington's first trial, not the most recent trial. However, that evidence, at 
least as summarized in Ellington I, is substantially identical to the evidence adduced at 
Mr. Ellington's second trial. 
One issue that deserves some clarification, however, is the Supreme Court's 
statement that "The expert testimony at trial also tended to show that the impact with 
the Subaru caused the Blazer to rotate somewhat in a counterclockwise direction, so 
that the Blazer was pointing across the road toward where the Honda was in the 
westbound lane, instead of pointing toward its initial path eastbound." Ellington I, 151 
Idaho at 58. This statement was amply supported by the trial evidence-including the 
testimony of the State's own expert-at the first trial. (See No. 33843 8/29/06 
Tr., p.874, Ls.1-16, (testimony of Trooper Sean Daly), p.878, L.23 - p.879, LA (same); 
No. 338439/1/06 Tr., p.1438, L.16 - p.1440, L.20.) 
During the second trial though, the State went to great length to try to show that 
the impact with the Subaru was not forceful enough to rotate the Blazer far enough in a 
counterclockwise direction to line it up with the Honda. It's retained accident 
reconstruction expert, John Daily (not to be confused with Trooper Sean Daly, one of 
the State's reconstruction experts in the first trial), testified that he was able to calculate 
the change in speed necessary to rotate the Blazer the approximately 45 degrees 
necessary to line it up with the Honda, and, because, given the relatively minor damage 
to the Blazer and the Subaru, as well as a lack of "scrub" marks on the pavement, there 
could not have been a change in speed involved in the collision between the Subaru 
and the Blazer so as to explain the full rotation of the Blazer. (See 1/23/12 Tr., p.887, 
Ls.10-15, p.888, Ls.3-9, p.888, L.12 - p.889, L.1, p.891, L.8 - p.893, L.6.) Thus, 
Mr. Daily concluded that "the collision would tend to cause that rotation a bit," but the 
rest of the rotation must have been attributable to steering. (1/23/12 Tr., p.897, Ls.1-5 
(emphasis added).) 
3 What neither the defense, nor the Idaho Supreme Court, knew at the time of the first 
appeal was that the State had committed a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963), by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence. (See 1/18/12 Tr., p.14, L.17 - p.15, 
L.2.) 
5 
State's reconstruction experts as to his opinion concerning Mr. Ellington's intent4); 
however, it declined to decide whether Mr. Ellington was entitled to a new trial on those 
bases.5 See id. at 59-71. Rather, it granted Mr. Ellington a new trial based on its 
conclusion that one of the State's reconstruction experts, Corporal Fred Rice (Idaho 
State Police), had given demonstrably false testimony at trial. Id. at 71-76. Specifically, 
it found that Cpl. Rice's testimony in Mr. Ellington's first trial was "false[ ] according to 
the well-established principles of accident reconstruction [the defense expert] had 
already testified to as well as his own testimony in [another] case and his own training 
materials." Id. at 76. 
4 The admission of the expert's opinion as to Mr. Ellington's intent was so patently 
improper that the Supreme Court noted that, "Had Mr. Ellington raised this issue as 
another instance of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal, we would have found, once 
again, that the State's conduct was improper." Ellington I, 151 Idaho at 67. 
5 Although it declined to engage in a prejudice analysis (because it was granting 
Mr. Ellington a new trial on other grounds), the Court nevertheless discussed the 
question of cumulative error: 
Given the multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct and evidentiary 
errors, there was undoubtedly more than one error at Mr. Ellington's trial. 
We note that when ruling on a motion for mistrial brought after an instance 
of alleged prosecutorial misconduct, the district court should not limit its 
view of the misconduct to the specific isolated incident, but should also 
take into consideration whether or not the prosecutor is engaging in a 
pattern of misbehavior. From a review of the record in this case it seems 
that the prosecutor was attempting to use every opportunity possible to 
appeal to the passions and prejudices of the jurors, including ignoring 
warnings and admonitions by the judge to try the case based on the facts. 
While the isolated instances of misconduct and evidentiary error in this 
case may not rise to the level of reversible error, we implore district courts 
to take into account all the factors surrounding a motion for mistrial, 
particularly in an emotionally charged trial such as this one where there 
are several indicators that the prosecutor is attempting to try the case 
based on emotion. We do not decide whether the errors individually or 
cumulatively warrant a reversal here because our resolution of the motion 
for new trial issue discussed below is dispositive. 
Ellington I, 151 Idaho at 70-71. 
6 
In light of the Supreme Court's opinion in Ellington I, Mr. Ellington's case was 
remanded for a new trial. In gearing up for the new trial, the State decided not to use 
the Idaho State Police reconstruction experts (Trooper Daly and Cpl. Rice) who had 
given improper testimony at the first trial; instead, the State retained a private accident 
reconstruction expert-John Daily, of Jackson Hole Scientific Investigations, Inc. (See 
R. Ex., p.69S.) Mr. Daily prepared an initial report on or about September 17, 2011 
(R. Ex., pp.704-0S (report), 709-66 (attachments)), although it is not clear exactly when 
that report was disclosed to the defense. That initial report discussed the timing of 
events occurring during the few critical seconds that elapsed from the time that 
Mr. Ellington began turning his Blazer around Scarcello Road, through the time that he 
struck Mrs. Larsen. (R. Ex., p.706.) It also discussed Mr. Daily's opinion as to the 
speed of Mr. Ellington's Blazer at various points during those few short seconds. 
(R. Ex., pp.706-0S.) However, it did not offer any calculations or scientific analysis 
concerning the question of whether, or to what extent, the Subaru's impact with the side 
of Mr. Ellington's Blazer caused the Blazer to rotate in a counter clockwise fashion 
toward the Honda.6 (See R. Ex., pp.706-0S.) 
6 The report did state, however, as follows: 
Ellington accelerated the Blazer to the left side of the Subaru, sideswiping 
it on its left front corner with the driver's side rocker panel and door of the 
Blazer. This impact caused minor damage to both vehicles, and it was 
unlikely there was any redirection from this impact. 
Ellington turned to the left, even though the eastbound lane was open to 
him, and continued to accelerate toward the Honda Accord containing the 
Larsen sisters .... 
(R., p.705 (emphasis added).) However, since these statements are not supported by 
any sort of analysis, they appear to have been more assumption than expert opinion. 
7 
At some point thereafter, the defense's retained accident reconstruction expert, 
David Rochford, of Inland Northwest Traffic Accident Investigation L.L.C} reviewed 
Mr. Daily's report (see Augmentation (Rochford Report, p.2))8 and provided a report of 
his own (see generally Augmentation (Rochford Report)).9 In his report, Mr. Rochford 
described what effect the collision between the Larsens' Subaru and Mr. Ellington's 
Blazer had on the Blazer: 
The tire marks from the Blazer are next seen on Scarcello, near the 
south east corner of Scarcello and the driveway. A close inspection of the 
tire marks reveals the presence of striations within the mark made by the 
right rear tire of the Blazer ("A" in Photo 7). The striations are nearly 
perpendicular to the direction of the tire's travel path. 
The perpendicular striations indicate that the rear tires of the Blazer 
were sliding sideways, to the south, as the Blazer continued to move 
forward to the east. These physical characteristics could only be caused 
by an impact which forced the Blazer to the right. The lack of angular 
(non-perpendicular) striations indicates there was no, or little, acceleration 
by the Blazer at this point. It could also indicate that Mr. Ellington's foot 
7 Mr. Rochford was not the defense's original accident reconstruction expert when this 
case was remanded for a re-trial. It appears that the defense initially retained the 
services of Dr. Wilson "Toby" Hayes, of Hayes & Associates, who had prepared a report 
in 2006, prior to Mr. Ellington's first trial. (See R. Ex., p.704 (referring to the Hayes 
report), p.706 (same), p.797 (same); 12/2/11 Tr., p.5, L.17 - p.7, L.10 (describing 
Dr. Hayes' work to that point for the defense).) However, on the eve of Mr. Ellington's 
re-trial, the defense learned that Dr. Hayes had recently been hired by the State in 
another Kootenai County criminal case under fairly questionable circumstances (the 
State hired Dr. Hayes to help prosecute some individuals for whom he had already done 
work, and in the very same matter in which he had done that work). (12/2/11 Tr., p.5, 
L.1 - p.7, L.25.) This turn of events caused the defense to lose confidence in 
Dr. Hayes. (12/2/11 Tr., p.5, L.1 - p.7, L.25.) Thus, it appears that sometime after 
December 2, 2011, the defense formally retained Mr. Rochford. (See 12/2111 Tr., p.7, 
Ls.19-25; see also 4/24/12 Tr., p.7, Ls.17-21 (indicating that Mr. Rochford was first 
contacted by the defense "[i]n the end of November of 2011 ").) 
8 Only a few pages of Mr. Rochford's report were put in the Clerk's Record in this case. 
(See R. Ex., pp.796-B01.) A complete copy of the report will be attached to 
Mr. Ellington's motion to augment the record. 
9 The record does not disclose precisely when Mr. Rochford's report was prepared or 
disclosed to the State, but it would have to have been prepared and disclosed sometime 
after December 2,2011. (See note 7, supra.) 
8 
was knocked off the accelerator by the force of the impact. The Blazer 
was rotated counter clockwise by the impact from the Subaru. The 
location where the striations stop indicate the point where the Blazer 
ceased to slide sideways, and its tires again gripped the pavement. 
The tire marks then travel in a circular, counter clockwise path, 
straighten near the south edge of the roadway, and then extend across 
the roadway in a north-east direction. 
There are not striations within the marks as the Blazer turns toward 
the roadway. This indicates there was no "side-slip." ... 
The tire marks then lead across the roadway at an angle of about 
45 degrees relative to the roadway. . .. The left side tire marks are visible 
in the photos as seen at arrow "0" in photo 6. There is also a tire mark at 
the centerline which is consistence in appearance and location with being 
a collision scrub from the front right tire of the Honda ("A" on Photo 8). 
(ld., pp.8-10 (emphasis added); accord id., pp.16, 17, 18.) Based on all of this, 
Mr. Rochford concluded that when the Blazer stopped rotating it was lined up with, and 
a mere 26 feet away from, the Honda; that is a distance that would have been covered 
by the Blazer in only one second, assuming maximum acceleration. (ld., p.18.) 
On or about January 15, 2012, a Sunday three days before jury selection was set 
to begin, Mr. Daily prepared a supplemental report. (See R. Ex., pp.767-68 (report), 
pp.769-71 (attachment).) In his supplemental report, Mr. Daily for the first time 
analyzed the question of whether "the Subaru drove into the side of the 1974 Blazer 
with enough speed to cause the Blazer to rotate counter-clockwise with enough change 
in direction to have it heading toward the Honda, without left steering input on the part of 
the driver of the Blazer." (R. Ex., p.767.) Critical to this analysis was Mr. Daily's 
calculation of the "speed change,,10 for both the Subaru and the Blazer. (R. Ex., p.768; 
10 It is important to note that the "speed change" referenced by Mr. Daily is not an 
impact speed. (R. Ex., p.768.) Unfortunately though, Mr. Daily never explained what 
this "speed change" means in practical terms. (See, e.g., 1/23/12 Tr., p.902, Ls.7-17 (in 
9 
see also R. Ex., pp.769-71 (hand-written calculations).) In performing his calculations, 
Mr. Daily relied on a specific rotational mechanics formula,11 which happens to be 
appear as Equation 9.67 in a textbook Mr. Daily co-authored, Fundamentals of Traffic 
Crash Reconstruction. (Compare R. Ex., p.770 (formula, with a reference to "Equation 
9.67, FTCR") with R. Ex., p.774 (excerpt of Chapter 9 ("Rotational Mechanics") of 
Fundamentals of Traffic Crash Reconstruction, which includes an Equation 9.67 
matching the equation used in Mr. Daily's calculations in this case).) 
Based entirely on this specific rotational mechanics formula, Mr. Daily calculated 
that, assuming the Subaru struck the Blazer two feet behind the Blazer's center of 
mass, in order to rotate the Blazer by 45 degrees, the "speed change" of the Subaru 
would have to have been in excess of 41 mph, and the "speed change" of the Blazer 
would have to have been approximately 24 mph. (R. Ex., p.767; see also R. Ex., 
pp.769-71 (calculations).) Ultimately, he concluded that because a collision involving 
"speed changes" of this magnitude "would have been a serious collision, with significant 
post-impact motion on the part of both vehicles" (R. Ex., p.768), but the physical 
answering a question about how a "speed change" occurs, stating, "If you have a 
collision between two vehicles, then-and if it's hard enough to change the motion, then 
you get a-it's actually called a change in velocity, but I'll use the term speed, and that 
speed change is based on how hard the hit is"); R. Ex., p.768 (explaining circularly that 
"speed change" "is the speed change that will provide enough force to rotate the struck 
vehicle from one angle to another").) 
11 That formula is identified as follows: w = -.J2Fh6/1• (R. Ex., p.770.) According to 
Mr. Daily's supplemental report, the symbols in this equation have the following 
meanings: 
w = angular velocity ... 
F = downward force on tires resisting rotation 
h = lever arm from point of rotation to point of resisting force (wheel base) 
8 = angular displacement ... 
I = yaw moment of inertia about point of rotation (center of front axle) 
(R. Ex., p.770.) 
10 
evidence tended to show that the collision of the Subaru into the side of Mr. Ellington's 
Blazer was not particularly forceful (R. Ex., p.767), the notion "that the Subaru impacted 
the Blazer with enough force to cause it to change direction to point toward the Honda is 
not supported either by the physical evidence or by analysis" (R. Ex., p.768). 
Mr. Daily's supplemental report was not disclosed to the defense until after 
Mr. Ellington's re-trial began. (R. Ex., p.867; see also 4/24/12 Tr., p.8, L.24 - p.9, L.11.) 
(Jury selection began on January 18, 2012. (See generally 1/18/12 Tr.» 
At trial, the State's theory was that Mr. Ellington intentionally crashed his Blazer 
into the girls' Honda and then intentionally ran over Mrs. Larsen. (See, e.g., 1/19/12 
Tr., p.315, L.17 - p.316, L.6, p.325, Ls.14-19, p.328, L.21 - p.329, L.6; 1/27/12 
Tr., p.1404, L.1 - p.1505, L.21, p.1410, L.14 - p.1411, L.13, p.1414, L.10, p.1418, L.15 
- p.1419, L.8, p.1430, Ls.11-21, p.1431, Ls.8-13, p.1449, Ls.10-11, p.1450, L.20 -
p.1451, L.14.) The State's theme was "choice"; it argued to the jury that Mr. Ellington 
should be found guilty as charged because, after the impact with the Subaru, he chose 
to turn his Blazer to the left and collide with the girls' Honda and, after disengaging with 
the Honda and starting to drive away from the wrecked Honda, Mr. Ellington chose to 
run down Mrs. Larsen. (See, e.g., 1/19/12 Tr., p.315, L.17 - p.316, L.6, p.325, LS.14-
19, p.328, L.21 - p.329, L.6; 1/27/12 Tr., p.1404, L.1 - p.1505, L.21, p.1410, L.14-
p.1411, L.13, p.1414, L.10, p.1418, L.15 - p.1419, L.8, p.1430, Ls.11-21, p.1431, LS.8-
13, p.1449, Ls.1 0-11, p.1450, L.20 - p.1451, L.14.) 
In an effort to convince the jury that Mr. Ellington acted intentionally, the State 
offered Mr. Daily's testimony. At trial, Mr. Daily testified consistently with his 
supplemental report; he opined, based on the aforementioned rotational mechanics 
calculation, that the Larsens' Subaru did not hit Mr. Ellington's Blazer with sufficient 
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force to rotate the Blazer far enough to cause it to hit the girls' Honda. (See 1/23/12 
Tr., p.881, L.20 - p.897, L.5.) In particular, Mr. Daily testified that he used principles of 
rotational mechanics to calculate the "speed change" necessary to rotate the Blazer 
counter clockwise by 45 degrees, and he came up with a "speed change on the part of 
the Subaru of about 41 to 42 miles an hour." (1/23/12 Tr., p.891, L.15 - p.892, L.20.) 
He then opined that, with this kind of "speed change," one would expect to see 
"extensive" damage to the Blazer and significant movement of the vehicles away from 
the point of impact. (1/23/12 Tr., p.892, L.21 - p.893, L.6.) Ultimately, Mr. Daily opined 
that, because the damage to the vehicles was indicative of a "non-penetrating" or "low 
energy" sideswipe12 collision (1/23/12 Tr., p.885, Ls.20-23, p.887, Ls.10-15, p.888, Ls.3-
9), not a significant collision, and because the tire marks left by the Subaru did not show 
any significant change in motion based on its collision with the Blazer (1/23/12 
Tr., p.888, L.12 - p.889, L.1), there is no way that the Subaru hit the Blazer with 
sufficient force to rotate it the full 45 degrees necessary to cause it to hit the Honda. 
(See 1/23/12 Tr., p.897, Ls.1-5 ("[T]he collision would tend to cause that rotation a bit 
but also steering.").) Obviously, this conclusion supported the State's theory that 
Mr. Ellington intentionally turned his Blazer toward the girls' Honda. 
Unbeknownst to the defense at the time of Mr. Daily's testimony (see R. Ex., 
pp.904-05; 4/24/12 Tr., p.8, Ls.10-20), in Fundamentals of Traffic Crash Reconstruction, 
the textbook co-authored by Mr. Daily, it was explained that the rotational mechanics 
formula has to be adjusted "[ilf the striking vehicle comes in at an angle different than 
90°," that "[a]s the angle gets more shallow (Le., closer to zero), then the solution 
12 A collision is considered to be a "sideswipe" if the impact angle is around 15 degrees 
or less. (R. Ex., p.905; see also 4/24/12 Tr., p.71, LS.10-22 (Mr. Daily's recognition that 
the Subaru hit the Blazer at an angle less than 45 degrees).) 
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becomes very sensitive to the angle and the presence of ground forces," and that "[i]t is 
recommended not to attempt this type of analysis for collisions that are less than 45°." 
(R. Ex., p.948.) Thus, it was unknown to the defense that Mr. Daily's use of the 
rotational mechanics formula to calculate the change of speeds involved in the Subaru-
Blazer collision, a very low-angle "sideswipe" collision, was wholly inappropriate 
according to Mr. Daily's own textbook. Accordingly, Mr. Daily was not cross-examined 
regarding the inappropriateness of his use of the rotational mechanics formula, or the 
obvious unreliability his calculations and his ultimate conclusion that the impact from the 
Subaru could not have caused Mr. Ellington's Blazer to rotate into the Honda. (See 
1/24/12 Tr., p.953, L.23 - p.958, L.10.) Further, the defense expert, Mr. Rochford, was 
never called to testify. (See generally 1/25/12 Tr., p.1270, L.20 - p.1350, L.5.) 
The fact witnesses gave substantially the same testimony that they had given at 
Mr. Ellington's first trial. At the end of the re-trial, the jury deliberated for some 
seventeen hours over the course of three separate days. (See R., pp.429-30 (indicating 
the jury deliberated from approximately 12:20 p.m. until approximately 4:45 p.m. on 
Friday, January 27, 2012), p.431 (indicating the jury deliberated continuously from 
approximately 9:00 a.m. until approximately 3:45 p.m. on Monday, January 30, 2012), 
p.432 (indicating the jury deliberated from approximately 9: 1 0 a.m. until approximately 
3:00 p.m. on Tuesday, January 31, 2012).) Ultimately, it came back with guilty verdicts 
on all three counts. 
Immediately after Mr. Ellington's trial, Mr. Rochford ordered a copy of Mr. Daily's 
textbook (Fundamentals of Traffic Crash Reconstruction) in an attempt to verify certain 
testimony that Mr. Daily provided. (R. Ex., pp.867, 904; 4/24/12 Tr., p.8, Ls.10-20.) In 
reviewing this textbook approximately three weeks later, he discovered that that 
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textbook makes it clear that the rotational mechanics formula used in this case was 
inappropriate based on the low angle of impact. (See REx., pp.904, 905, 906; 4/24/12 
Tr., p.14, L.17-p.15, L.25, p.17, L.17-p.20, L.17, p.23, L.10-p.24, L.15.) 
Based in part on Mr. Rochford's post-trial discovery, on February 13, 2012 Oust 
two weeks after the conclusion of the trial), the defense filed a motion for a new trial. 
(R, pp.544-45.) Although Mr. Ellington sought a new trial on numerous grounds, the 
one which is relevant to the present appeal is the claim that he had discovered new, 
material evidence establishing the falsity of Mr. Daily's trial testimony insofar as 
Mr. Daily testified that a rotational mechanics formula could be used to determine 
whether the Subaru,s impact on the side of the Blazer could have rotated the Blazer 
toward the girls' Honda. (See R, p.545; REx., pp.865-68.) 
Approximately a month after filing the motion itself, Mr. Ellington filed a 
memorandum in support of that motion (see REx., pp.830-69) and a plethora of 
supporting materials, including (but not limited to): an affidavit prepared by Mr. Rochford 
explaining, inter alia, his post-trial review of Mr. Daily's writings and the inconsistencies 
of those writings and Mr. Daily's trial testimony (see REx., pp.903-07); excerpts from 
Fundamentals of Traffic Crash Reconstruction showing the rotational mechanics 
formula used by Mr. Daily in this case, discussing the limitations of that formula in 
crashes where the angle of impact is between 45 and 90 degrees, and cautioning that 
the formula should not be used in crashes where the angle of impact is less than 45 
degrees (see REx., pp.944-45, 947-48); a transcript of Mr. Daily's trial testimony 
showing, inter alia, Mr. Daily's false claim that it was appropriate to use his rotational 
mechanics formula (see REx., pp.973-1077); and a transcript of the prosecutor's 
closing argument, wherein the prosecutor argued extensively that the jury should 
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Mr. Ellington guilty as charged because he intentionally turned his Blazer first in the 
girls' Honda, then into Mrs. Larsen, as evidenced by the "fact" that Mr. Daily's 
calculations showed Mr. Ellington's Blazer was not spun into the Honda by the Larsens' 
Subaru. (see R. Ex., pp.1079-1107). 
Later, Mr. Ellington filed additional materials in support of his motion for a new 
trial. (R., pp.712-18.) This time, Mr. Ellington offered the curriculum vitae and affidavit 
of John R. Howell, another accident reconstruction expert. In his affidavit, Mr. Howell 
stated that he reviewed Mr. Daily's reconstruction analysis in this case, as well as 
certain materials authored by Mr. Daily, including Mr. Daily's textbooks, and he averred 
that Mr. Daily's use of a rotational mechanics analysis in this case was inconsistent with 
Mr. Daily's own written work and "improper in this field of work." (R., pp.713-14.) In 
particular, Mr. Howell stated as follows: 
In Mr. Daily's direct testimony he state that the impact between the Subaru 
and Blazer [w]as a "non-penetrating sideswipe," which would place the 
angle of the impact at between zero and five degrees, much less than 
necessary for the application of rotational mechanics. The momentum of 
both vehicles combined with the coefficient of friction of the surface with 
any adulterants would affect the direction of force. The proper method to 
determine speed in this situation is explained in Daily's books in the 
chapters on Conservation of Momentum and Conservation of Energy, not 
rotational mechanics. 
(R., p.714.) 
In the meantime, the State had responded to Mr. Ellington's motion for a new trial 
with supplemental materials of its own, including (but not limited to): an affidavit from 
Mr. Daily reiterating his opinion (based on the calculations in his supplemental report) 
that the impact from the Larsens' Subaru did not cause Mr. Ellington's Blazer to rotate 
into the girls' Honda, and asserting that all of his testimony was wholly consistent with 
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his publications 13 (see Augmentation (Daily Affidavit») 14; Mr. Daily's curriculum vitae 
(see Augmentation (John Daily Curriculum Vitae) 15; Mr. Daily's original report, and the 
attachments thereto, none of which included a rotational mechanics analysis (see 
R. Ex., pp.704-52); Mr. Daily's supplemental report, and the calculations attached 
thereto, which for the first time showed that Mr. Daily's opinion that the impact of the 
Larsens' Subaru into the side of Mr. Ellington's Blazer did not cause his Blazer to rotate 
into the girls' Honda (see R. Ex., pp.767-71); excerpts from Fundamentals of Traffic 
Crash Reconstruction dealing with conservation of linear momentum and rotational 
mechanics, but omitting the page of that textbook that discusses the inapplicability of a 
rotational mechanics analysis in a low-angle impact (see R. Ex., pp.772-81); and 
Mr. Rochford's report (see Augmentation (Rochford Report). 
13 With regard to the issue of the impact angle, and the concern that, because the 
impact angle was extremely low, the rotational mechanics formula used by Mr. Daily 
was wholly inappropriate, Mr. Daily stated as follows: 
Mr. Rochford alleges in Paragraph 24 and 25 of his affidavit that the 
principle direction of force would not be 90 degrees in evaluating the 
Blazer-Subaru impact. The distance to the center of mass to the force line 
that I calculated was 90 degrees, not the distance to the side of Subaru. 
(R. Ex., p.696 (emphasis added).) While this post hoc explanation is remarkably 
inarticulate and unclear (perhaps by design), it appears that what Mr. Daily said was 
that even though the Subaru-the thing which applied the force to the Blazer-came in 
and struck the Blazer at a very low angle (somewhere from 0 to 15 degrees, 
apparently), he nevertheless "calculated" a direction of force of 90 degrees. If this 
sounds absurd, it probably is. As Mr. Daily's own textbook makes clear, in determining 
whether the rotational mechanics formula may be used, one does not arbitrarily say the 
directional force is 90 degrees despite a very different impact angle; one must look at 
the angle at which "the striking vehicle comes in." (R. Ex., p.948 (page 310 of 
Mr. Daily's Fundamentals of Traffic Crash Reconstruction).) 
14 Only three of the four pages of Mr. Daily's affidavit were put in the Clerk's Record in 
this case. (See R. Ex., pp.695-97).) A complete copy of the affidavit will be attached to 
Mr. Ellington's motion to augment the record. 
15 Only a few pages of Mr. Daily's curriculum vitae were put in the Clerk's Record in this 
case. (See R. Ex., pp.698-703.) A complete copy of the curriculum vitae will be 
attached to Mr. Ellington's motion to augment the record. 
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The State also submitted a memorandum in opposition to the motion. 
(R., pp.644-68.) With regard to the substance of Mr. Ellington's claim that Mr. Daily 
testified falsely, as proven by Mr. Daily's own written materials, the State simply 
asserted in conclusory fashion as follows: 
Mr. Daily's testimony at trial was wholly consistent with his written 
publications, most notably his textbooks, Fundamentals of Crash 
Reconstruction [sic] and Fundamentals of Applied Physics for Traffic 
Accident Investigations. Plaintiff's Exhibits 1-12. Furthermore, the 
conclusions reached by Mr. Rochford in his pretrial report as well as his 
post trial affidavit are questionable. Plaintiff's Exhibits 1-12. As such, the 
defense allegations of new evidence fail. 
(R., p.665.) The bulk of the State's argument was focused on the four-part test, set 
forth in State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685 (1976), for determining whether new evidence 
warrants a new trial under I.C. § 19-2406(7). (R., pp.665-68.) Specifically, the State 
argued that the defense's new evidence of Mr. Daily's false testimony was not truly 
"new" because Mr. Daily's published works were known to the defense in advance of 
trial; that new evidence was "merely impeaching," not "material"; that new evidence 
would not have produced an acquittal; and, even if the evidence was "new," it was 
evidence could have been discovered by the defense through reasonable diligence. 
(R., pp.665-68.) 
Thereafter, the defense filed a reply memorandum. (See R., pp.680-89.) That 
memorandum criticized the State for failing to address the substance of the claim that 
Mr. Daily testified falsely, and it argued that the new evidence could not have 
reasonably been discovered prior to trial because, while Mr. Daily's many publications 
were in existence prior to Mr. Ellington's trial, the defense could not have known which 
ones were relevant, at a minimum, until Mr. Daily submitted his supplemental report 
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during trial, which disclosed the basis for his opinion that the Larsens' Subaru did not 
cause Mr. Ellington's Blazer to rotate into the girls' Honda. (R., pp.688-89.) 
A hearing was held on Mr. Ellington's motion for a new trial on April 24, 2012. 
(See generally 4/24/12 Tr.) At that hearing, the district court heard testimony from both 
Mr. Rochford and Mr. Daily. (See 4/24/12 Tr., p.6, L.14 - pA5, L.6 (testimony of 
Mr. Rochford), pA5, L.25 - p.81, L.9 (testimony of Mr. Daily).) Not surprisingly, 
Mr. Daily continued to insist that his trial testimony was truthful and consistent with his 
prior writings. With regard to the issue of the angle of impact, Mr. Daily gave different 
stories, but never actually explained how it is that his rotational mechanics formula 
could be applied in a case involving a low-angle sideswipe where his textbook 
specifically says that that formula should not be used in low-angle collisions. Initially, 
Mr. Daily suggested that the angle of impact is simply not relevant: 
A. . .. [R]otational mechanics looks at a force that's acting on what's called a 
lever arm and a lever arm is 90 degrees to the force. It doesn't matter how 
the force is coming in, what matters is where is the point of rotation, where is 
the center of mass, if you will, compared to that force. And we look at the 
right angle distance from the center of mass to the force. 16 
(4/24/12 Tr., pA8, Ls.17-24.) Next, he suggested that the angle of impact is relevant, 
but that deviations from 90 degrees in the angle of impact are (and were) easily 
accounted for: "[If] [w]e brought it in at some angle other than 90 degrees, then what 
we would have to do and the reason for the [sine] function is to calculate the length of 
this lever arm. So there's nothing inconsistent about it."17 (4/24/12 Tr., p.54, Ls.21-25.) 
16 Obviously, this suggestion flies in the face of what appears in Mr. Daily's textbook, 
where it was made clear that the angle of impact is very important. (See R. Ex., p.948.) 
17 This explanation is problematic for two reasons. First, it appears that Mr. Daily's 
calculations in this case did not account for an angle of impact less than 90 degrees by 
using "the sine function" to calculate the length of the lever arm, as his calculations for 
the angular velocity simply used a lever arm length equal to the wheel base of the 
blazer, and his calculations for the change in speed used an estimated lever arm length 
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After that, Mr. Daily simply dodged the relevant question by giving a non-responsive 
answer: 
MR VERHAREN: Q. He [Mr. Rochford] made the statement that it 
was-the contact here I think was, and I might have this wrong, far less 
than 45 degrees in substantiating his claim that your testimony differed 
from your book. Do you recall that? 
A. Yes, and that's-I made the assumption in my report that the 
Subaru was stopped or moving so slowly that its motion was not 
significantly changed in any way, so we really don't have an impact. 
We've got essentially the Subaru stopped and the Blazer running past it. 18 
(4/24/12 Tr., p.55, Ls.1-11.) Finally, Mr. Daily again testified that the angle of impact 
simply does not matter: "I don't care where the principal direction of force or anything 
else comes into this vehicle. If I can calculate the distance from the line of force 90 
degrees to the center of mass I can calculate rotation.,,19 (4/24/12 Tr., p.60, Ls.19-23.) 
The district court did not rule on Mr. Ellington's motion for a new trial at the 
hearing on that motion; instead, it entered a written decision a few weeks later. (See 
R, pp.821-39.) It denied the motion. (R, pp.836-39.) In doing so, the district court 
took a curious approach-it correctly identified the general nature of Mr. Ellington's 
of two feet, which represent an estimate of the distance from the Blazer's center of 
mass to the point of impact. (See REx., pp.768, 769, 771.) Second, even if Mr. Daily 
had accounted for the angle of impact being less than 90 degrees by using "the sine 
function" to calculate the lever arm, this still would have been incorrect according to his 
textbook because, according to that textbook the rotational mechanics formula should 
not have been used at all since the angle of impact in this "sideswipe" crash was less 
than 45 degrees. (See REx., p.948.) 
18 While one could legitimately wonder how Mr. Daily could truthfully claim there was no 
"impact," given that he prepared a report in which he attempted to analyze the effects of 
the "collision" between the Subaru and the Blazer (see REx., pp.767-71 (supplemental 
report)), later, on cross-examination, Mr. Daily claimed that he said there was no 
"impact" because he was attempting to distinguish an "impact" from the "sideswipe" in 
this case. (4/24/12 Tr., p.67, L.12 - p.68, L.18.) This might have been a reasonable 
explanation on Mr. Daily's part, had he not, moments later, used the term "impact" to 
describe the Subaru-Blazer collision. (See 4/24/12 Tr., p.60, L.24 - p.61, L.6.) 
19 Again, this testimony flies in the face of what appears in Mr. Daily's textbook, where it 
was made clear that the angle of impact is very important. (See REx., p.948.) 
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argument, i.e., that Mr. Daily "testified falsely" and that Mr. Ellington "could not have 
discovered that Mr. Daily's testimony was based on the incorrect theory of 'rotational 
mechanics,' prior to trial and that the testimony is inconsistent with the text books used 
[sic] by Mr. Daily" (R., p.837), but it then analyzed Mr. Ellington's claim as if 
Mr. Rochford's opinions were the newly discovered evidence (see R., pp.837-39). With 
Mr. Ellington's claim so misconstrued, the district court reasoned that Mr. Ellington's 
argument failed under each of the four prongs of the Drapeau test. (R., pp.837-39.) 
Specifically, it ruled that: (1) since Mr. Rochford's opinion (that the Subaru caused the 
Blazer to rotate into the Honda) was known in advance of trial, there was no new 
evidence; (2) "the evidence offered by Mr. Rochford . . . is at best impeachment 
evidence that the Defendant could have used during trial"; (3) because Mr. Rochford's 
opinion on this issue went only to whether Mr. Ellington struck the girls' Honda 
intentionally, not whether he struck Mrs. Larsen intentionally, his testimony "would not 
have produced an acquittal" on the murder charge and, given the other evidence in the 
case, it would not have produced an acquittal on the aggravated battery charges; and 
(4) "because the Defendant had Mr. Daily's opinion, the exhibits, and his materials 
available prior to and during trial, as well as Mr. Rochford available to analyze 
Mr. Daily's materials and opinions prior to and during trial (which Mr. Rochford did), the 
Defendant actually discovered the inconsistent statements and/or incorrect application 
of the rotational mechanics theory prior to and during trial." (R., pp.837-39.) The district 
court made no finding as to whether Mr. Daily testified falsely by offering an opinion 
based on rotational mechanics formula which his own textbook indicated should not 
have been used in this case. (See R., pp.836-39.) 
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In the meantime, Mr. Ellington had been sentenced a few months earlier, while 
the motion for a new trial was still pending. (See generally 3/26/12 Tr.) The district 
court imposed a unified sentence of 18 years, with eight years fixed, for second degree 
murder, and concurrent unified sentences of ten years, with six years fixed, for the two 
counts of aggravated battery. (3/26/12 Tr., p.56, Ls.2-6; R, p.674.) A judgment of 
conviction was entered on April 4, 2012. (R, pp.673-75.) 
On March 26, 2012, Mr. Ellington filed a notice of appeal timely from the 
judgment of conviction.20 See I.A.R 17(e)(2) (providing that a notice of appeal that is 
filed following an oral pronouncement by the court, but before a written order or 
judgment is entered, ripens and becomes effective upon entry of the written order or 
judgment). On appeal, Mr. Ellington contends that the district court erred in denying his 
motion for a new trial. 
20 The notice of appeal is not presently in the Clerk's Record. It will be attached to a 
motion to augment the record. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Ellington's motion for a new trial where there was 
newly-discovered evidence showing that the State's retained accident reconstruction 
expert testified falsely at Mr. Ellington's trial? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Ellington's Motion For A New Trial 
A. Introduction 
Almost immediately following his trial, Mr. Ellington discovered new evidence-a 
passage in a textbook co-authored by the State's accident reconstruction expert, John 
Daily-which showed that Mr. Daily had testified falsely at Mr. Ellington's trial. In 
particular, it showed that Mr. Daily gave false testimony when he claimed that a certain 
rotational mechanics formula could be used to determine whether the impact of the 
Larsens' Subaru caused Mr. Ellington's Blazer to rotate toward the Larsen daughters' 
Honda, and that he gave false and misleading testimony when he opined, based on his 
calculations using that formula, that Mr. Ellington steered his Blazer in the girls' Honda. 
Although, in evaluating Mr. Ellington's motion for a new trial based on this newly 
discovered evidence, the district court applied the proper legal standard, unfortunately, 
it did not grasp the nature of the newly-discovered evidence. Accordingly, its analysis of 
Mr. Ellington's motion was flawed and its ultimate conclusion-that Mr. Ellington was 
not entitled to a new trial-was in error. 
Mr. Ellington contends that when the relevant legal standard is applied to the 
correct evidence, it is apparent that he is entitled to a new trial, and he asks this Court 
to order as much. Alternatively, he asserts that, because the district court failed to 
grasp the nature of the new evidence, at a minimum, his case should be remanded to 
the district court for consideration of the newly-discovered evidence in light of the 
controlling standard. 
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B. Applicable Legal Standards 
Idaho law provides that a defendant in a criminal case, after having been found 
guilty, may seek a new trial under certain limited circumstances. See I.C. § 19-2406. 
One permissible basis for a new trial is "[w]hen new evidence is discovered material to 
the defendant, and which he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and 
produced at the trial. ... " I.C. § 19-2406(7). 
Generally, the standard employed in evaluating a motion for a new trial based on 
newly-discovered evidence is that which was identified in State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 
685 (1976).21 See Ellington /, 151 Idaho at 72-73. In Drapeau, the Idaho Supreme 
Court had held that a motion for a new trial based on newly-discovered evidence should 
be granted where the following four conditions are met: 
(1) ... the evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to the 
defendant at the time of trial; (2) ... the evidence is material, not merely 
cumulative or impeaching; (3) ... it will probably produce an acquittal; and 
(4) ... failure to learn of the evidence was due to no lack of diligence on 
the part of the defendant. 
Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691 (quoting 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: 
Criminal § 557, at 515 (1969)). 
Idaho's appellate courts will review the denial of a motion for a new trial for an 
abuse of discretion. "Because a motion for new trial involves mixed questions of law 
and fact, '[a]n abuse of discretion will be found if the trial court's findings of fact are not 
21 There are narrow circumstances in which slightly different standards may apply. See, 
e.g., Ellington /,151 Idaho at 74-75 (holding that a modified version of the Drapeau test 
applies "in the particularly egregious case of perjury by a State officer"); State v. 
Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380, 384-85 (1985) (applying a different standard where the new 
evidence is a recantation of trial testimony). Mr. Ellington concedes, however, that this 
is not such a case, and that the Drapeau standard controls. 
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supported by substantial evidence or if the trial court does not correctly apply the law.'" 
Ellington /, 151 Idaho at 72. 
C. The District Court Erred In Denyinq Mr. Ellington's Motion For A New Trial 
Because Mr. Ellington Satisfied The Four-Part Test For A New Trial Under 
State v. Drapeau 
As noted, the new evidence in this case must be evaluated under the four-part 
Drapeau test. Applying that standard to the claim actually raised, Mr. Ellington asserts 
that he is entitled to a new trial. Below, Mr. Ellington, analyzes each of the four prongs 
of the Drapeau test (although not in the order in which they appear in Drapeau) and 
explains why he has satisfied each of them. 
1. The Evidence Is Newly Discovered And Was Unknown To The Defendant 
At The Time Of Trial 
In evaluating Mr. Ellington's motion for a new trial, the district court believed that 
the new evidence identified by Mr. Ellington was the fact that Mr. Daily's opinion 
(concerning whether the impact from the Subaru had caused the Blazer to rotate 
counter clockwise by approximately 45 degrees) was incorrect. (See R, pp.837-39.) 
Thus, the district court reasoned that, because the defense knew at trial that Mr. Daily's 
conclusion in this regard was incorrect, there was no newly-discovered evidence in this 
case. (See R, pp.837, 839.) 
The district court, however, failed to understand what Mr. Ellington was claiming 
to be "new evidence." The new evidence was not the fact that Mr. Daily's opinion was 
wrong; it was the actual evidence supporting that conclusion-the last paragraph of 
page 310 of Fundamentals of Traffic Crash Reconstruction, the textbook co-authored by 
Mr. Daily. (See REx., p.948.) The district court's error in this regard is best illustrated 
by reference to Ellington I. In Ellington I, the defense undoubtedly knew that Cpl. Rice 
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had testified falsely as soon as he testified; thus, the fact that he had testified 
untruthfully was not the newly-discovered evidence. The new evidence was the 
conglomeration of written materials, discovered after the trial, showing that Cpl. Rice 
had testified falsely. See Ellington I, 151 Idaho at 73. Likewise, this time around, the 
newly-discovered evidence is not the fact that Mr. Daily testified falsely; it is the 
evidence showing he testified falsely. 
Viewing Mr. Ellington's claim in the proper light, there can be little doubt that the 
relevant portion of Fundamentals of Traffic Crash Reconstruction was newly-discovered 
and was not known to the defense at the time of trial. The uncontested evidence is that 
the defense ordered the relevant text during the trial, and that it was not received until 
after the trial had concluded. (R. Ex., pp.904; 4/24/12 Tr., p.8, Ls.10-20.) Accordingly, 
any conclusion that Mr. Ellington's new evidence was not, in fact, new was clearly 
erroneous. PacifiCorp v. Idaho State Tax Com'n, 153 Idaho 759, 767 (2012) 
(recognizing that factual findings are clearly erroneous if they are not supported by 
substantial and competent evidence). 
2. The Failure To Learn Of The Evidence Is Due To No Lack Of Diligence On 
The Part Of The Defendant 
The fourth prong of the Drapeau test (whether the new evidence should have 
been discovered by the defense) is logically related to the first prong (whether the 
purported new evidence is truly new), so it makes sense to examine that prong next. 
The district court made the same error in evaluating the fourth prong as it did in 
evaluating the first prong-it failed to recognize what the new evidence actually was. 
(See R., p.839.) In believing that the new evidence was the fact that Mr. Daily applied 
the wrong theory and reached the wrong ultimate conclusion, the district court ruled that 
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"the Defendant actually discovered the inconsistent statements and/or incorrect 
application of the rotational mechanics theory prior to and during triaL" (R., p.839.) 
However, as noted above, the new evidence was not the fact that Mr. Daily misled the 
jury; it was the evidence that proved that fact, i. e., the last paragraph of page 310 of 
Fundamentals of Traffic Crash Reconstruction. 
Thus, the relevant question is whether diligent defense counsel should have 
known of this portion of Mr. Daily's textbook. In analyzing this question, the inquiry must 
necessarily focus on the question of "diligence." Certainly, the "diligence" requirement 
does not require the study of every piece of evidence that may be in existence prior to 
trial. If it did, the Drapeau standard would not have been written as it was. There would 
have been no need to mention (in the first prong) the evidence being "unknown" to the 
defense, or to require (in the fourth prong) "diligence" on the part of the defendant; there 
could simply be a three-part test requiring that the evidence: (1) came into existence 
after trial; (2) is material; and (3) would probably produce an acquittal. 
Since Drapeau created a four-part test, not the hypothetical three-part test just 
described, it should be read as it was written; it should be read to allow a new trial in 
situations in there was evidence in existence prior to trial, which reasonably went 
undiscovered by the defense until after trial. Assuming the Drapeau standard is so 
construed, "diligence" (as that term is used in the fourth prong) would turn on what is 
reasonable given the unique facts and circumstances of a given case. See State v. 
Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 153-54 (2008) (Trout, J., dissenting). 
In this case, the relevant portion of Mr. Daily's Fundamentals of Traffic Crash 
Reconstruction could not reasonably have been known to the defense in advance of 
trial. Although Mr. Daily and his publications were apparently disclosed to the defense 
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well in advance of trial, his curriculum vitae reveals that he has published (individually or 
with co-authors) three textbooks, one of which is the multi-volume Fundamentals of 
Traffic Crash Reconstruction (Augmentation (John Daily Curriculum Vitae, pp.9-10)), at 
least four law enforcement and law journal articles (id., p.9), at least eight peer reviewed 
articles (id., p.10), and at least 37 white papers (id., pp.10-13). In addition, it reveals 
that he has significant teaching experience (id., pp.8-9), which presumably would have 
involved production of written materials. This is such a vast amount of highly technical 
material that it would be patently unreasonable to say that the defense should have 
carefully reviewed each and every page of it, including those portions which may not 
have seemed relevant to the testimony Mr. Daily was ultimately expected to give. 
A reasonably diligent defendant would only expend the resources to delve into 
matters that appear reasonably related to the case. And, in this case, it was not until 
Mr. Daily submitted his supplemental report, where he first used a rotational mechanics 
formula to analyze the question of whether the Larsens' Subaru struck Mr. Ellington's 
Blazer with sufficient force to rotate it toward the girls' Honda, that the defense had 
reason to delve into Mr. Daily's written materials concerning rotational mechanics. 
Unfortunately though, the defense did not receive that report until the trial began. 
(R. Ex., p.867; see also 4/24/12 Tr., p.8, L.24 - p.9, L.11.) At that point, because 
Fundamentals of Traffic Crash Reconstruction had to be ordered and then took a couple 
weeks to arrive (see R. Ex., pp.867, 904; 4/24/12 Tr., p.8, Ls.10-20), it was already too 
late for the defense to review that material and use it at Mr. Ellington's trial. Thus, even 
with reasonable diligence, Mr. Ellington would not have discovered the relevant material 
in Mr. Daily's textbook. 
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3. The Evidence Is Material, Not Merely Cumulative Or Impeaching 
The second prong of the Drapeau test requires that the new evidence be 
material, not merely cumulative or impeaching. Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691. In this case, 
the district court found that Mr. Ellington's new evidence was "at best impeachment 
evidence." (R., pp.837-38.) 
The district court is incorrect. Mr. Ellington submits that the new evidence in this 
case is both impeaching and material. Cf Ellington I, 151 Idaho at 74 (describing the 
difference between impeachment evidence and material ("substantive") evidence, and 
making it clear that a given piece of evidence may be both impeaching and material). 
The basic distinction between impeachment evidence and substantive evidence 
was discussed in Effington I: 
The Court of Appeals has aptly described the difference between 
impeachment evidence and substantive evidence: 
Unlike substantive evidence which is offered for the purpose 
of persuading the trier of fact as to the truth of a proposition 
on which the determination of the tribunal is to be asked, 
impeachment is that which is designed to discredit a witness, 
i.e. to reduce the effectiveness of his testimony by bringing 
forth the evidence which explains why the jury should not put 
faith in him or his testimony. Examples of impeachment 
evidence would include prior inconsistent statements, bias, 
attacks on [the] character of a witness, prior felony 
convictions, and attacks on the capacity of the witness to 
observe, recall or relate. Evidence may be both substantive 
and impeaching. 
State v. Marsh, 141 Idaho 862, 868-69 ... (Ct. App.2004) (quoting 
Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 334-35 ... (Ct. App.1998)) .... 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "material evidence" as that evidence 
U[h]aving some logical connection with the consequential facts." Black's 
Law Dictionary 1066 (9th ed. 2009) .... 
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Ellington I, 151 Idaho at 74. In Ellington /, the Court also made it clear that the purpose 
for which the given evidence could be admitted is instructive as to whether it is 
impeachment evidence, substantive evidence, or both. See id. (explaining that, under 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 801, a prior inconsistent statement may be admitted may be 
admitted for its truth under certain circumstances and, therefore, is substantive 
evidence-even if it also happens to impeach the credibility of the declarant). 
In this case, the new evidence-the portion of Mr. Daily's textbook which made it 
clear that Mr. Daily applied a rotational mechanics formula that he knew actually had no 
application in this case-was undoubtedly impeaching. It undoubtedly discredits him by 
making him look like a dishonest "hired gun" who, for the right price, will say anything 
the State wants him to say. 
But the new evidence is also material. Had it been offered at trial, the relevant 
portion of the textbook could have been admitted for its truth. See I.R.E. 803(18) 
(learned treatise exception to the general hearsay rule). This alone suggests that the 
evidence in question is, in fact, material. See Ellington /, 151 Idaho at 74. Further, this 
evidence has a logical connection with the consequential facts of the case. Specifically, 
it establishes that, given the low angle of impact in the Subaru's collision with 
Mr. Ellington's Blazer, a certain rotational mechanics formula cannot be used to 
measure the magnitude of the impact necessary to rotate the Blazer into the Honda. 
4. The Evidence Would Probably Have Produced An Acquittal 
The third prong of the Drapeau test requires that, in order for a new trial to be 
warranted, the new evidence must be such that it likely would have produced an 
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acquittal had been offered at trial. Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691. The new evidence in this 
case meets that standard. 
As discussed above, the State's theory at trial was that Mr. Ellington intentionally 
crashed his Blazer into the girls' Honda and ran over Mrs. Larsen. Consistent with this 
theory, in arguing its case to the jury, the State's theme was "choice," i.e., it argued that 
Mr. Ellington chose to twice turn his Blazer to the left-first to strike the Honda, then to 
strike Mrs. Larsen. In presenting this theory and this theme, the single most critical 
piece of evidence that the State had was Mr. Daily's testimony that he was able to 
mathematically determine the magnitude of the collision necessary to rotate the Blazer 
into the Honda and, given those calculations, which showed that a significant collision 
was necessary to rotate the Blazer sufficiently, as well as the physical evidence, which 
was not indicative of a collision of the necessary magnitude (based on the 
aforementioned mathematical determination), he raised the inference that Mr. Ellington 
had willfully turned his Blazer to the left, and into the girls' Honda. This not only 
supported the State's theory that Mr. Ellington intentionally struck the Blazer (thereby 
committing two counts of aggravated battery), but also supported the theory that he 
intentionally struck Mrs. Larsen (thereby committing murder). After all, the jurors would 
have reasoned, if Mr. Ellington was not simply trying to flee his pursuers, and he was 
actually going after some of them (the girls), he was probably going after Mrs. Larsen as 
well. And this was all supported by the apparent certainty of a mathematical calculation. 
But, had it been made clear to the jury that Mr. Daily had no valid mathematical 
basis to quantify the collision necessary to have rotated Mr. Ellington's Blazer into the 
Honda, there would have been no basis to make it appear certain that the collision did 
not rotate the Blazer into the Honda and, thereby, raise the inference that Mr. Ellington 
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must have chosen to turn his Blazer to left to strike the Honda. In that case, the State 
could not have proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Ellington willfully struck the 
girls' Honda or that he intentionally killed Mrs. Larsen, and Mr. Ellington likely would 
have been acquitted on both counts. 
D. Alternatively. To The Extent That This Court Cannot Fully Evaluate The Question 
Of Whether Mr. Ellington Was Improperly Denied A New Trial Owing To The 
District Court's Misunderstanding Of The New Evidence Presented, This Case 
Should Be Remanded For Further Proceedings 
Mr. Ellington contends that there is an adequate record for this Court to conclude 
that the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial, and to therefore reverse 
the district court's order denying his motion and remand his case for a third trial. 
However, he recognizes that the district court's misapprehension of the nature of his 
new evidence and, thus, the claim actually presented in his motion for a new trial, 
makes it somewhat more challenging to evaluate the district court's exercise of 
discretion in denying his motion. Accordingly, Mr. Ellington requests that, to the extent 
that this Court cannot conclude that he was improperly denied a new trial owing to the 
district court's misunderstanding of the evidence, the district court's order be vacated, 
and his case remanded for further proceedings on the motion for a new trial in light of 
the new evidence actually offered. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Ellington respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the district court's order denying his motion for a new trial, and that it remand 
his case to the district court for a third trial. Alternatively, he requests that this Court 
vacate the order denying his motion for a new trial, and that it remand the case to the 
district court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 14th day of August, 2013. 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
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